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delegations to those institutions more consistent with federalism. Insofar as delegating to inter-
national institutions redistributes national legislative authority, and in a fashion that is difficult
to retract, it may be conceived as a bulwark against the concentration of political power that
is consistent with the ambitions of federalism. If international law's inroads against the several
states is considered, so too should we assess its potential for checking excessive authority in
the national government, even if that checking function is performed more by foreign govern-
ments and foreign citizens than by more local- and increasingly, ineffectual-agents.
None of this is to suggest that delegation concerns will be resolved in the near future; the
U.S. position is simply too ambivalent. On the one hand, the United States is obsessed with the
notion ofnational sovereignty and a leader in its respect for democratic governance in domestic
matters. At the same time, it has historically prospered in international institutions not just be-
cause it has been judicious in its engagements, but also because it is unusually powerful-in
short, because the antidemocratic, unaccountable character of international governance serves
its interests to a substantial degree. Given this tension, and the arc of globalization, it is likely
that delegation issues will surface with greater fiequency, and with greater salience, overcom-
ing any continuing resistance to their fullest consideration.
SELF-EXECUTING TREATIES AND DOMESTIC JUDICIAL REMEDIES
by David Sloss*
At a meeting of this Society more than fifty years ago, Myres McDougal claimed: "[T]his
word 'self-executing' is essentially meaningless, and.., the quicker we drop it from our vocab-
ulary the better for clarity and understanding."' Unfortunately, the fog ofconfusion surrounding
the term has only thickened in the past fifty years.
When courts and commentators use the term "self-executing" to refer to treaties, they often
conflate questions of international law with questions of domestic law. For example, the Re-
statement says that a treaty is non-self-executing if it "manifests an intention that it shall not
become effective as domestic law without the enactment of implementing legislation."2 This
formulation conflates two very different issues: whether a treaty is executory (a question of
international law) and whether it has the status of law domestically in the absence of imple-
menting legislation (a question of domestic constitutional law).
In Foster v. Neilson,3 Chief Justice Marshall held that Article 8 of an 1819 treaty with Spain
was executory as a matter of international law because it created an international legal obli-
gation to convey property in the future; it did not create an international legal obligation to
convey property immediately upon ratification.4 In accordance with Justice Marshall's analysis,
a treaty is not "executory" if it creates an international obligation that takes effect immediately
upon entry into force of the treaty.
Whether a ratified treaty has the status of law in the United States in the absence of imple-
menting legislation is an entirely different question, one of domestic constitutional law not
international law. Even so, courts often attempt to answer this question by examining the words
of a treaty to discern whether the drafters intended the treaty to have the status of law in the
United States in the absence of implementing legislation. (The political branches sometimes
Associate Professor of Law, Saint Louis University School of Law.
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2 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 11 1(4)(a) (1987).
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4 See David Sloss, Non-Self-Executing Treaties: Exposing a Constitutional Fallacy, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1,
19-24 (analyzing Foster).
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avert this problem by insisting on enacting implementing legislation before ratification. Here,
I address only those treaties that are ratified without implementing legislation.) The courts'
attempts to discern the treaty makers' intentions on this point are misguided; the question of
a treaty's status within the domestic U.S. legal system is controlled by the Constitution, not the
treaty makers.
To clear away the confusion surrounding the doctrine of self-executing treaties, it is helpful
to distinguish among three discrete issues that courts often combine under the self-execution
label. The first is whether a particular treaty provision has the status of law within the domestic
legal order. The supremacy clause states expressly that all treaties "made under the authority
of the United States shall be the supreme Law of the Land."6 Therefore, all duly ratified treaties
have the status of domestic law in the United States, except for specific provisions that are not
"made under the authority of the United States." A treaty provision that purports to restrict
speech protected by the First Amendment, for example, is not law within the United States
because the treaty makers do not have the authority to override the First Amendment. Simi-
larly, a treaty provision that purports to appropriate funds is not law in the absence of imple-
menting legislation because the power to appropriate funds is granted exclusively to Congress.
However, apart from those few cases where a treaty provision exceeds the scope of the treaty
makers' domestic lawmaking powers, all duly ratified treaties have the status of domestic law,
even in the absence of implementing legislation, because the supremacy clause says so.7
The second issue that lurks behind the self-execution label is individual rights. Whether a
treaty creates individual rights is a question of international law. To answer that question,
courts should employ generally accepted methods of treaty interpretation. If a treaty provision
is executory, as in Foster v. Neilson,' it does not create individual rights until the treaty is
executed. Similarly, a treaty provision does not create individual rights if it creates only hori-
zontal duties between states (as opposed to vertical duties that states owe to individuals),9 or
if it is so vague that courts cannot ascertain the scope of a state's duty under the treaty.10
In contrast, a treaty provision creates individual rights under international law if it is imme-
diately effective and it imposes a specific, vertical duty that a state owes to an identifiable class
of individuals. Thus, for example, article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations
creates individual rights under international law because it creates a specific, nonexecutory duty
that states owe to a particular class of individuals.1
The third issue that the self-execution label obscures has to do with domestic judicial reme-
dies. U.S. courts often maintain that individuals who are harmed by treaty violations cannot
obtain domesticjudicial remedies unless the treaty itself creates a private cause of action." That
'See Stefan A. Riesenfeld, The Doctrine ofSelf-Executing Treaties andU.S. v. Postal: Win atAny Price?, 74 AJIL
892, 895-96 (1980) (the question of whether a treaty's domestic effects are "to be achieved by legislation or by the
treaty itself is a question of constitutional law and not within the purview of the intent either of all parties to the treaty
or of a particular ratifying power").
6 U.S. CONST. ART. VI, cl. 2.
See Sloss, supra note 4, at 46-55 (elaborating this point in greater detail).
8 Supra note 3.
9 See, e.g., Edye v. Robertson (Head Money Cases), 112 U.S. 580, 598 (1884) (distinguishing between treaties that
are "primarily a compact between independent nations" and treaties that "confer certain rights upon the citizens or
subjects of one of the nations residing in the territorial limits of the other").
" See, e.g., Sei Fujii v. State, 242 P.2d 617, 619-22 (Cal. 1952) (holding that articles 55 and 56 of the UN Charter
are not self-executing because they merely create a general duty to promote human rights without specifying the
particular rights to be protected).
" See Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 UST 77, 596 UNTS 261, art. 36, para. 1
(providing an individual right for detained foreign nationals to consult with a consular officer and obligating states
to inform foreign nationals about this right).
2 See, e.g., Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 808 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., concurring: "Absent
authorizing legislation, an individual has access to courts for enforcement of a treaty's provisions only when the treaty
[itself] ... expressly or impliedly provides a private right of action").
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approach is misguided. Where an individual invokes a treaty defensively, the question whether
the treaty creates a private cause of action is irrelevant.13 Where an individual invokes a treaty
offensively, it should not matter whether the treaty itself creates a private right of action, pro-
vided that there is some other source of law--constitutional, statutory, or common-that
grants the individual a private right of action.'4 For example, in American Insurance Assoc. v.
Garamendi5 the Supreme Court approved a judicial remedy for private plaintiffs who alleged
violations of bilateral agreements between the United States and European governments, even
though the agreements themselves did not grant them a private cause of action. 6
The view that individuals cannot obtain domestic judicial remedies unless the treaty itself
creates a private cause of action also misconceives the relationship between international rights
and domestic remedies. Treaties rarely address explicitly the question of private rights of action
because domestic law governs decisions about which remedy to give a particular individual in
a given context. Moreover, under generally accepted principles of international law, states
parties are obligated to provide a remedy within their domestic legal systems for any person
who is harmed by a violation of a treaty provision that confers individual rights on that person,
even if the treaty is silent with respect to remedies. 7 Therefore, the fact that a treaty is silent
with respect to private rights of action does not mean that the treaty makers intended to
preclude domestic judicial remedies. To the contrary, if a treaty creates individual rights but
is silent with respect to domestic remedies, domestic courts should ordinarily provide a remedy
for individuals harmed by violations of their treaty-protected rights, absent a clear statement
of political intent to limit domestic judicial remedies. 8
Thus, when individuals seek domestic judicial remedies for treaty violations, courts should
not ask whether the treaty is self-executing. Instead, they should begin by asking two questions:
(1) Is the treaty the law of the land under the supremacy clause? (2) Does the treaty create
individual rights under international law for the person seeking relief? (In most cases, courts
can safely assume that the answer to the first question is "yes," without explicitly deciding.) If
the answer to either question is "no," the individual is not entitled to relief for the alleged treaty
violation. However, if the answer to both questions is "yes," the court should address the merits
of the claim or defense, subject only to limitations (such as standing, ripeness, or mootness) that
would preclude a court from reaching the merits of a claim or defense in which an individual
sought a judicial remedy for a statutory violation.
13 See, e.g., United States v. Duarte-Acero, 132 F.Supp.2d 1036, 1040 n. 8 (S.D. Fla. 2001) ("Courts have
uniformly held that there is no private cause of action under the ICCPR.... However, because Defendant is raising
his ICCPR claims defensively, this limitation does not apply.").
14 See Carlos Manuel Vazquez, Treaty-Based Rights and Remedies of Individuals, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 1082,
1143-57 (1992) (discussing rights of action that plaintiffs can use to enforce treaty claims).
11 123 S. Ct. 2374 (2003).
16 See id. The Supreme Court did not identify the source of the plaintiffs' private right of action in Garamendi. The
Court apparently assumed, sub silentio, that the supremacy clause creates a private right of action for some treaty-
based preemption claims against state officers. See David Sloss, Exparte Young and Federal Remedies for Human
Rights Treaty Violations, 75 WAsH. L. REv. 1103 (2000) (contending that the supremacy clause creates an implied
private right of action for certain treaty-based preemption claims).
7 See, e.g., LaGrand (Germany v. United States of America) (Judgment of June 27, 2001) paras. 79-91, available
at <http://www.icj-cij.org> (holding that the United States was obligated to give the LaGrand brothers domesticjudicial remedies for violation of their rights under article 36 of the Vienna Convention, even though the Convention
is silent with respect to domestic remedies).
"S Non-self-executing declarations clearly express the intent of the political branches to limit domestic judicial
remedies for treaty violations, but such declarations should not be construed as a complete bar to domestic judicial
remedies. See David Sloss, The Domestication oflnternationalHuman Rights: Non-Self-Executing Declarations and
Human Rights Treaties, 24 YALE J. INT'L L. 129 (1999) (contending that some judicial applications of human rights
treaties are consistent with the treaty makers' intent in adopting non-self-executing declarations). See also Sloss,
supra note 4, at 41-44 (contending that the Constitution mandates judicial remedies for treaty violations in some
cases).
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